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KEEPING THE ARMS IN TOUCH: TAKING POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY SERIOUSLY IN THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE†
ABSTRACT
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution embodies the
principle of state sovereign immunity, long held to bar suits by private litigants
in federal courts or under federal law who seek redress for rights violations at
the hands of state governments. But states themselves are not the only
prospective defendants shielded by this form of sovereign immunity. As a
subset of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the arm-of-the-state doctrine
allows government entities closely situated to their respective state
governments to partake of the state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. Unfortunately, this doctrine, both in theory and in application, has
been fraught with inconsistency and incoherence since the Supreme Court
introduced it in 1977.
In its 1994 decision, Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, the
Court offered some guiding rationales to assist the lower federal courts in
conducting their arm-of-the-state analyses. The Court directed federal courts
to analyze the status of state government entities in light of the twin reasons for
sovereign immunity: protection of both the state’s treasury and the state’s
dignity. While these twin reasons were intended to aid courts in applying the
various factors of their arm-of-the-state tests, unfortunately—like the
jurisprudence that preceded it—the Hess precedent has proven to be minimally
effective.
As a solution, this Comment argues that, rather than the rationales
previously offered by the Court, a political accountability rationale ought to
guide the arm-of-the-state inquiry. This rationale has been present in the
Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence generally but has yet to be
substantially incorporated in the arm-of-the-state context. By assessing factors
that evaluate the degree to which a state’s interests sufficiently coincide with
an entity’s affairs as well as the degree to which a state exercises sufficient

† This Comment received the 2014 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and
Writing.
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control over an entity, courts may better gauge whether a given entity is
politically accountable to the state. Thus, courts can ensure that government
entities held to partake of their state’s sovereign immunity likewise are
accountable to the same democratic forces that justify and check states’ own
assertions of sovereign immunity. Incorporating such a rationale will more
effectively preserve the integrity of the democratic process in our federal
system.
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INTRODUCTION
What do a county sheriff, a public school district, and a state lottery
commission all have in common? They are arms of the state and immune from
suit under Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity1 jurisprudence.2
What else do a county sheriff, a public school district, and a state lottery
commission all have in common? They are not arms of the state and therefore
not immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence.3 At first blush, such blatant contradiction seems puzzling to say
the least; unfortunately a closer examination of the decisions applying this
doctrine, rather than revealing nuance and sophistication, simply exposes a
muddled mess.
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity shields states from private
suits for money damages in federal court or under federally-created claims
unless a state voluntarily waives its immunity or Congress validly abrogates it.
A doctrine has evolved whereby arms of the state—entities situated
sufficiently close to the state so as to, in effect, be part of the state itself—are
likewise immune.4 Federal courts5 have recognized various government
entities as arms in their respective states, from state universities6 and lottery

1 Unless otherwise noted, all uses of “sovereign immunity” or its variant in this Comment refer to
Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity under the U.S. Constitution.
2 Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (sheriff); Wojcik v. Mass. State
Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2002) (lottery commission); Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch.
Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250–51 (9th Cir. 1992) (public school district).
3 Burrus v. State Lottery Comm’n, 546 F.3d 417, 423 (7th Cir. 2008) (lottery commission); Black v.
N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 598 (5th Cir. 2006) (public school district); Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (sheriff).
4 For a general discussion of the arm-of-the-state doctrine with a summary of each circuit test, see
17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 123.23[4] (3d ed. 2013).
5 Unless otherwise noted, all references to “courts” in this Comment are to federal courts.
6 E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2011).
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commissions7 to public school districts8 and county sheriffs9 or even
government contractors10 in rare instances,11 but on the other end of the
spectrum, courts consistently recognize that political subdivisions, such as
cities and counties, are not arms of the state.12 To determine whether an entity
is an arm of the state, federal courts typically engage in fact-intensive,
multifactor inquiries guided by various rationales.
Arm-of-the-state analysis is complicated by the fact that in recent decades,
state and local government structures have evolved considerably. Increasingly
specialized government entities offer a variety of public services beyond
classic core governmental functions, and government has grown while
simultaneously becoming more fragmented through privatization, revenue
sharing, and decentralization.13 These processes have produced a limitless
variety of government entities, and when litigants sue such entities, courts must
decide whether these entities are arms of the state.
The Supreme Court has never offered an authoritative, systematic
framework or test for conducting this arms inquiry. The circuit courts have
instead crafted widely divergent tests, incorporating different factors and
considerations into their analyses. The Supreme Court has articulated a few
rationales to guide lower courts, but even these rationales have proved
ineffective in generating consistency or coherence among the lower courts.14
Missing from the jurisprudential and scholarly dialogue is any developed
appreciation for the role democratic processes and political accountability
ought to play in the arm-of-the-state context. The Court has endeavored to
stress the importance of these mechanisms in its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence generally, as both a justification for and a logical corollary of
7
8
9
10

2000).

E.g., Wojcik, 300 F.3d at 96.
E.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1992).
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1309–10, 1313 (11th Cir.

11 For a detailed sampling of entities federal courts have recognized as arms of the state as well as entities
denied such immunity, see 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524.2 &
nn.67–68 (3d ed. 2014).
12 Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (denying that state sovereign immunity should
extend to counties as is the case with “any city, town, or other municipal corporation”); N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 194–95 (2006) (confirming that counties are not entitled to sovereign
immunity).
13 See Joseph Beckham, The Eleventh Amendment Revisited: Implications of Recent Supreme Court
Interpretations on the Immunity of Public Colleges and Universities, 27 STETSON L. REV. 141, 147 (1997).
14 See infra Part I.
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sovereign immunity, but the Court has only touched in passing on the
importance of political accountability in its arm-of-the-state cases.
This Comment argues that federal courts should take political
accountability seriously in the Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the-state context
to ensure that those entities that are to be cloaked in the state’s sovereign
immunity are likewise subject to the same forces of political accountability to
which the state is itself subject. Courts can do this by ensuring, first, that the
state’s interests sufficiently coincide with a given entity’s affairs such that the
statewide electorate would be in a position to care about the entity’s conduct or
policies, and second, that the state exercises the kind of control over an entity
to be able to hold that entity accountable. Accordingly, courts should assess
factors that meaningfully gauge these two elements and disregard those factors
that do not.
Taking political accountability seriously in the arm-of-the-state context
would not necessarily ensure uniformity in the circuits’ tests—only an
authoritative test handed down by the Supreme Court might accomplish that.
Case law may still produce facially inconsistent results where a type of entity
may be recognized as an arm in one state but not in another depending on the
particularities of state law.15 And unless the Court adopts a single bright-line
rule, the arm-of-the-state inquiry will inevitably require judges to engage in
fact-intensive analyses involving case-by-case judgment calls. But by taking
political accountability seriously, courts can better avoid mistakenly conferring
immunity on entities that lack close political ties with the state, lest they
benefit from the state’s sovereign immunity without the corresponding political
accountability that otherwise holds the sovereign in check.
To make the case for political accountability in the arms context, Part I
briefly surveys the development of the arm-of-the-state doctrine, showing how
a doctrinal twist spiraled into jurisprudential contortion. Then, Part II pulls the
jurisprudence apart, teasing out the weaknesses inherent in the twin animating
rationales the Court intended to guide the doctrine in its application. After
diagnosing the problem inherent to the existing framework, Part III suggests a
solution: a political accountability rationale ought to be incorporated into
arm-of-the-state jurisprudence to better ensure that those entities recognized as
arms are likewise politically accountable to the state. Part IV suggests a
possible framework that incorporates a political accountability rationale,

15

See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
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exploring which factors would be relevant in a reconceived arm-of-the-state
test. In critique of present practices, Part V examines factors courts presently
consider but that skew a political accountability-inspired arms analysis.
Finally, Part VI puts this Comment’s framework to the test, considering how
such an analysis might stack up had it been applied in a recent case handed
down by the Fifth Circuit, United States ex rel. King v. University of Texas
Health Science Center–Houston.16
Though the plaintiff in that case appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision,
requesting the Supreme Court to give desperately needed clarity to the
arm-of-the-state doctrine,17 the Court once again passed on an opportunity to
do so.18 It has been more than twenty years since the Court’s last
comprehensive foray into this jurisprudence,19 and in light of the Court’s
recent decisions in other sovereign immunity contexts making it more difficult
for private litigants to sue government entities, the arms doctrine is likely to be
fertile ground for litigation in the years to come.20 Accordingly, the time is ripe
for courts to begin taking political accountability seriously in Eleventh
Amendment arm-of-the-state jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ENDURING ENIGMA OF THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE
DOCTRINE
In general, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents the state from
being sued against its will.21 Current jurisprudence holds that states may be
sued by other states or by the federal government but that states are immune
from suit by all private litigants.22 In addition, Eleventh Amendment immunity
protects states from suit both in federal court and in their own state courts
under federally created claims.23 Courts have recognized a few exceptions
though: private litigants may sue state officers for prospective injunctive relief

16
17
18
19
20

544 F. App’x 490 (5th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 1767 (2014).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, King, 134 S. Ct. 1767 (No. 13-927), 2014 WL 411565.
134 S. Ct. 1767 (mem.).
See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy: Praise and Protest, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 373

(2000).
21

For a summary of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3524.
Id.
23 Id. Though the Eleventh Amendment enshrines the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to the
states, historically courts have interpreted this immunity to be broader than the literal words of the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
22
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under Ex parte Young,24 and a court may find that a state’s immunity has been
waived or abrogated under narrow exceptions.25 But for these few exceptions,
states are generally immune from damages suits by private litigants both in
federal court and under federally created claims.
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity serves various policy goals. Two
such goals articulated by the Supreme Court include protection of state
treasuries and protection of state sovereignty from the affront to a state’s
dignity that would result from being haled before a court against its will.26 In
addition to these explicit Court-articulated goals, commentators have argued
that state sovereign immunity serves additional interests. The doctrine curbs
judicial interference in state affairs, giving government officers greater
discretion and allowing government to operate more efficiently.27 Sovereign
immunity can also further federalism principles by restricting Congress’
powers vis-à-vis the states—the federal government is less able to create
liabilities that bind state governments.28 Finally, because the actions of elected
government officials theoretically reflect the will of the people, sovereign
immunity furthers the interests of popular sovereignty by protecting state
majoritarian policy preferences.29 Thus, courts and commentators alike have
articulated a number of normative bases for why states ought to enjoy
immunity from suit under federal law in our federal system.30
These state-minded policy interests can be implicated without a state’s
formally being named as a defendant in a suit. Accordingly, in 1977 the
Supreme Court first recognized, in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle, that it may be appropriate to confer Eleventh Amendment
immunity to “arm[s] of the State,” that is, to lesser government entities
subordinate to the state.31 The Court briefly considered whether a local public
board of education in Ohio was entitled to state sovereign immunity in a suit
by a fired school teacher.32 In assessing “the nature of the entity created by
24

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3524.3.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3524.
26 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002); Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1994).
27 CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 153 (1972).
28 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE
STATES 3–4 (2002).
29 See JACOBS, supra note 27, at 152.
30 For a legal and normative critique of the doctrine of sovereign immunity however, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
31 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
32 See id. at 281–83.
25
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state law,” the Court considered several facts, or factors, pertaining to the
county school board’s structure and relationship to the state.33 Ultimately, the
Court determined that the board was more like a political subdivision than an
arm of the state and as such did not warrant being shielded by the state’s
sovereign immunity.34
In one sense, the Court’s willingness to consider dismissing suit on
sovereign immunity grounds even without the state’s formally being a
defendant was not a new practice: the Court had long held that regardless of
the named defendants, dismissal of a suit is proper where the state is
nonetheless the real party in interest.35 But in another sense, both the language
and legal theory of Mt. Healthy made for a new twist. Prior cases where courts
had found the state to be the real party in interest were cases in which the state
itself—and its treasury—arguably was the intended target of the litigation.36 In
Mt. Healthy, though, the defending party was an entity with its own funds
distinct from the state’s.37 Thus, Mt. Healthy suggested the possibility that a
lesser government entity might share such a close relationship with the state
that such an entity ought to be cloaked in the state’s sovereign immunity so as
to protect the state’s sovereign interests, even if the state’s treasury were not
directly implicated.
While the basic rationale for conferring immunity upon arms of the state
may seem intuitive, unfortunately, from its inception, the arm-of-the-state
doctrine has lacked direction, coherence, and consistency. This has made
possible the contradiction where a type of entity can be an arm of the state in
one instance but not be an arm of the state in another instance, depending upon
both the circuit test used and the applicable state laws governing the defendant

33

Id.
Id. at 280–81. The Court considered the following to be relevant: Ohio law’s definition of “state” did
not include local school districts, the school board was one of many boards that received guidance from the
State Board of Education, the school board received substantial funding from the state, but the board also had
the power to issue bonds and levy taxes. Id. at 280.
35 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd.
of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002))); see also In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 488 (1887).
36 See Jonathan W. Needle, Note, “Arm of the State” Analysis in Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence,
6 REV. LITIG. 193, 207 (1987) (explaining that previous real-party-in-interest cases presented no
arm-of-the-state question because any damage award would clearly have been paid from the state treasury).
37 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 276, 280.
34
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entity.38 In the wake of Mt. Healthy and an analytically similar decision two
years later, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,39
commentators criticized the Court for failing to articulate a guiding rationale
for the factor-based analyses used in its decisions.40 In each case, the Court
highlighted several traits of the entity in question, but the Court failed to
indicate whether these traits constituted formal factors, whether its list of
factors was exhaustive, or what such factors were intended to measure. To be
fair, perhaps the Court did not intend to delineate a systematic framework for
its arms doctrine in these cases, instead hoping lower courts would develop it.
But if not, its decision to introduce a new legal concept without a guiding
rationale or a normative definition against which other entities could be
compared left courts with little guidance as they subsequently attempted to
adapt their own arms tests to the Court’s precedents.41
The Court finally articulated a guiding rationale for its arms doctrine in
Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.42 In what has been the Court’s
most substantial arm-of-the-state case to date, the Court explained that “the
Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons for being” are the protection of the states’
treasury and dignity interests.43 While the Court’s incorporation of sovereign
immunity rationales into the arms context was a welcome development,
unfortunately, Hess raised more questions than it answered.
It is unclear, for example, how the twin reasons function analytically in the
arms inquiry. Previous courts had considered a mix of factors in one analytical
step to determine whether an entity was an arm of the state.44 The Hess court,
in contrast, appeared to consider the twin reasons as a second stage of analysis

38

See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
440 U.S. 391 (1979). The Court determined that a bistate entity created jointly by California, Nevada,
and Congress was not an arm of the state. Id. at 393, 401–02. The Court considered as relevant the legal
description of the entity in the compact, the fact that a majority of the entity’s governing members were locally
appointed, the source of the entity’s funding, whether the state was directly liable for judgments against the
entity, whether the entity engaged in local or state functions, whether the entity’s rulemaking power was
subject to state veto, and California’s attempt to sue the entity indicating a lack of state control over the entity.
See id. at 401–02.
40 E.g., Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity: Disarray
in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1992); see also
Needle, supra note 36, at 202–04.
41 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 1243–44.
42 513 U.S. 30 (1994).
43 See id. at 39–40, 47–48, 52.
44 See supra notes 31–34, 38–41 and accompanying text.
39
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after first considering various factors, which pointed in different directions.45
This would seem to be the obvious reading at first blush,46 but the Court then
proceeded to reconsider several factors, suggesting that, rather than functioning
as a second stage of analysis subsequent to and distinct from the initial
factor-based analysis, the twin reasons instead are to function as a prism
through which the factors should then be refracted.47 If this is the correct
analytic reading though, it is unclear what rationale should guide the initial
factor analysis prior to consideration of the twin reasons. Protecting state
treasury and dignity interests may be the basis for state sovereign immunity
generally, but what is the normative basis for determining what an arm of the
state is? What is the prototypical example of an arm of the state against which
other entities can be compared, or are state arms inherently indefinable?48
So cryptic and confusing was Hess that shortly after the decision, one
commentator predicted any existing lower court precedent could be made to fit
within Hess’s precedent.49 Circuit court decisions in the years since Hess have
largely borne out this prediction. While some circuits have attempted to
restructure their arms tests to conform to Hess’s analysis,50 other circuits have
merely read Hess as a gloss on their own precedents, insisting that Hess’s twin
reasons implicitly pervade the arms tests and factors these circuits already
use.51 Even the circuits that have refashioned their arms tests in response to
Hess have only done so facially, leaving their substantive analysis
45

See Hess, 513 U.S. at 44–48, 52 (considering such facts as which governing authority appointed the
entity’s commissioners, the degree of state veto power and control over the entity, the legal description of the
entity in state case law and the legislation creating the entity, whether the entity’s functions were state or local
in character, and finally the entity’s financial independence vis-à-vis the states’ financial responsibility for the
entity including whether the entity received state appropriations or generated its own funds).
46 See, e.g., Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (following this approach).
47 See Hess, 513 U.S. at 47, 50 (reconsidering in light of the twin reasons the following: state control
over the entity including appointment of commissioners and veto power, and the states’ financial responsibility
for the entity and the entity’s financial independence).
48 Professor Timothy Terrell has explained that, from a legal positivist perspective, an understanding of
the central case of a given legal concept, including the defining features and traits that constitute the central
case, is critical if one is to discern with any confidence whether any given instance fits within the respective
legal concept. Timothy P. Terrell, “Property,” “Due Process,” and the Distinction Between Definition and
Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L. REV. 861, 865–68 (1982). The arm-of-the-state doctrine’s lack of a clear
central case has accordingly contributed to the incoherency and inconsistency of its doctrinal development.
49 L. Pahl Zinn, Note, Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation: Erosion of the Eleventh
Amendment, 1995 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1417, 1459.
50 E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that the First Circuit
had “relied primarily on the Court’s decision in Hess to reformulate [its] analysis as a two-part inquiry whose
steps reflected the Eleventh Amendment’s twin concerns for the States’ dignity and their financial solvency”).
51 E.g., Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 300–02 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Our approach is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent . . . .”).
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unchanged.52 Given Hess’s failure to offer meaningful, systematic guidance in
the arm-of-the-state context, lower courts have been left to their own devices to
fashion their arms tests not simply in the years since Hess—rather, they have
been on their own since the Court’s first arms cases in the late 1970s.53
Because these cases themselves failed to offer a coherent framework for
discerning which entities qualify as arms of the state, it is no surprise the lower
courts’ tests are so widely divergent.54 Given this lack of clarity or consistency
in arm-of-the-state jurisprudence, one court has even admitted, “The
jurisprudence over how to apply the arm-of-the-state doctrine is, at best,
confused.”55
Calling the arm-of-the-state doctrine “confused” is generous; one
commentator has instead characterized the doctrine as being in a complete state
of disarray.56 The decades since Mt. Healthy have produced the following: four
Supreme Court sample case analyses, none of which purport to offer a
systematic arm-of-the-state test or a formalized list of factors; two competing
Eleventh Amendment rationales intended to guide the factor analysis; twelve
very different circuit court tests, each with their own twists, measuring a litany
of factors that vary by circuit; and scores of lower court precedents classifying
a limitless variety of entities as arms of their respective states shielded with
52 E.g., Irizarry-Mora, 647 F.3d at 12 (“[T]he ‘reshaping’ of our law did not represent an actual change
in the substance of the analysis.”).
53 Regents of the University of California v. Doe also concerned the arm-of-the-state doctrine, but this
case concerned one narrow question pertaining to the Court’s framework rather than offering a comprehensive
analysis of the test as a whole as Hess did. See 519 U.S. 425, 426 (1997).
54 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.23[4][b][iv]; see also Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659
(7th Cir. 2012) (considering “(1) the extent of the entity’s financial autonomy from the state” wherein the court
considers (a) “the extent of state funding,” (b) “the state’s oversight and control of the entity’s fiscal affairs,”
(c) “the entity’s ability to raise funds independently,” (d) “whether the state taxes the entity,” and (e) “whether
a judgment against the entity would result in the state increasing its appropriations to the entity”; and “(2) the
‘general legal status’ of the entity” (quoting Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845–47 (7th Cir. 1987)));
Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 628 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2010) (considering “(1) the State’s potential
liability for a judgment against the entity; (2) the language by which state statutes and state courts refer to the
entity and the degree of state control and veto power over the entity’s actions; (3) whether state or local
officials appoint the board members of the entity; and (4) whether the entity’s functions fall within the
traditional purview of state or local government” (quoting Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005)));
Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering “(1) whether a money judgment
would be satisfied out of state funds; (2) whether the entity performs central governmental functions;
(3) whether the entity may sue or be sued; (4) whether the entity has the power to take property in its own
name or only in the name of the state; and (5) the corporate status of the entity” (quoting United States ex rel.
Ali v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 353 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
55 Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996).
56 Rogers, supra note 40, at 1296.
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their state’s sovereign immunity, or else not, with outcomes varying not only
circuit by circuit but state by state within a given circuit.57
In responding to the disarray, instead of taking the present framework as a
given, this Comment pulls it apart and identifies how the present framework
has failed. While not purporting to offer a single definitive, infallible test, this
Comment simply suggests how arm-of-the-state jurisprudence might be set on
the right track by incorporating a rationale that has hitherto largely been
ignored. To begin that discussion, this Comment first explores the inherent
flaws of the current arm-of-the-state jurisprudential framework.
II. PULLING APART THE ARMS (DOCTRINE): WHY HESS’S TWIN REASONS ARE
INCOMPLETE
Before examining how the underlying rationale for the arm-of-the-state
doctrine might be reconceived, this Comment first considers the current
doctrinal framework’s flaws. In doing so, this Comment shows that while
Hess’s twin reasons perhaps may form an adequate basis for Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity generally, the twin-reasons framework is
nonetheless inadequate in the application of the arm-of-the-state doctrine itself.
A. Reason One: Protecting the State’s Treasury—Direct Blows, Ripple
Effects, and All Shades in Between
Before Mt. Healthy introduced the modern arm-of-the-state doctrine,
federal courts had long barred suit where the court found a state to be the real
party in interest in the litigation. Since the state is ordinarily immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment, clever litigants might attempt to work around
this obstacle by naming another individual or entity as the defendant rather
than the state itself.58 In such cases where a monetary judgment would
nonetheless inevitably draw from the state treasury, courts blocked these suits
as well.59 Typically, these real-party-in-interest suits named state government
officials as the defendants,60 but sometimes the defendant might be a

57

MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.23[4]; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, at 3524.2.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–65 (1974).
59 Id.
60 E.g., id. at 653; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 460, 463–64 (1945)
(naming as defendants, in addition to a state entity, the individuals that constituted the entity’s executive
board), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
58
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government entity instead.61 Not all suits targeting the state were barred,
though. Where a private litigant sued a state officer in his official capacity for
injunctive relief, which effectively is still a suit against the state, courts held
such suits did not run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.62
The basis for differentiating between injunctive and damages suits against a
state might seem unclear at first blush, but such differentiation is consistent
with the historic basis for the Eleventh Amendment. After the Supreme Court
interpreted Article III of the Constitution to permit a citizen of one state to
bring a suit for damages against another state in Chisholm v. Georgia,63
Congress enacted and the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment, which bars
federal courts from hearing suits “against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State.”64 Chisholm was decided in 1793 when many states found
themselves grappling with Revolutionary War debt, and many lawmakers
feared that, as had the plaintiff in Chisholm, more creditors would sue
cash-strapped state governments to collect on war debts.65 This historic context
led Justice Ginsburg to conclude in Hess that the primary purpose of state
sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is to protect
state treasuries—and taxpayer dollars—from monetary judgments so that states
might be able to administer their financial affairs without the insolvency risk
that private suits threaten.66 Under this reading, the evil to be avoided under the
Eleventh Amendment is not the possibility of any and all suits against states by
private litigants but rather suits for damages.67
This narrative would appear to provide the conceptual basis for the
arm-of-the-state doctrine. While not explicitly using real-party-in-interest
phraseology itself, the Mt. Healthy Court cited to a line of cases where an
61 E.g., State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 196, 200 (1929); Lincoln Cnty. v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 529–30 (1890).
62 E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 159 (1908); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 3524.3 (discussing the Ex parte Young doctrine). The Ex parte Young doctrine does permit prospective
enforcement of federal law against a state that may result in monetary expenditures from the state, but such
expenditures are considered to have only an ancillary rather than a direct effect on the treasury. WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 11, § 3524.3.
63 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For a discussion of Chisholm and its historic backdrop, see William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1045–63 (1983).
65 MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.04[2]; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.10.1, at 190–91 (4th ed. 2011).
66 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (“[T]he impetus for the Eleventh
Amendment [is] the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury.”).
67 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, § 2.10.1, at 190–91.
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effort to protect the state from monetary judgments was the controlling
rationale.68 While Mt. Healthy and its progeny began to consider a variety of
nonfinancial liability factors,69 the protection of state treasuries persisted as the
dominant rationale in the Court’s four arm-of-the-state cases.70 Accordingly,
for decades lower courts have assigned the most weight in their arms analyses
to factors that tracked the treasury-protection rationale.71 Conceptually,
analysis under the arm-of-the-state doctrine would appear to be
straightforward: if, in a suit against a government entity, a court finds the state
to be the real party in interest and on the hook to pay the resulting judgment,
then a conferral of the state’s immunity upon that entity is warranted, but
otherwise not.
But there are two problems with making a real-party-in-interest analysis
dispositive. First, whether the state would be the real party in interest in a suit
against a given entity is not necessarily an either–or calculation. When a
government entity is sued, the closeness of the relationship between the
particular entity and the state affects how financially implicated the state’s
treasury would be in the event of a judgment.72 Focusing only on the narrow
question of whether the state would directly pay for a judgment against an
entity73 ignores other ways in which a state nonetheless might be on the hook.
If a state were required by its own laws to cover an entity’s general budgetary
shortfalls, then a judgment against that entity would indirectly require the state
to pay such a judgment via increased appropriations to that entity.74 Or, if the
state were required to cover an entity’s shortfalls as a result of only certain
kinds of legal harms, a judgment against that entity in a suit for which the state
was not responsible might financially weaken the entity, making it more reliant

68 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (citing, inter alia,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 460 (1945),
overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890)).
69 See Needle, supra note 36, at 203.
70 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400–01 (1979); see also cases cited supra
note 68.
71 MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.23[4][b][ii] n.51 (ten circuits).
72 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 1291–96.
73 E.g., Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006).
74 See, e.g., Holz v. Nenana City Pub. Sch. Dist., 347 F.3d 1176, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding this
fact as a basis for conferring immunity to an entity).
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on the state in future suits for which the state would be responsible.75 Even if
the state were not legally required to cover an entity’s budgetary shortfalls, if
the statutory scheme nonetheless anticipated that as a matter of expected
process, such an entity would turn to the state for financial support, we might
still consider the state legally responsible for the entity’s finances.76
There are yet other ways in which a state might be financially implicated
by a suit against a lesser entity. Under a broader definition of state funding that
includes appropriations that an entity receives from the state77 or revenue that
an entity is permitted to generate itself under a legal grant of authority from the
state78—such as assessments, user fees, or revenue bonds79—one might
consider the state to be legally responsible for a judgment against an entity,
even though the state treasury expends nothing itself, because these other
state-authorized generated revenues would pay the judgment.80 Or, if an entity
ordinarily contributed money to the state’s treasury rather than only received it,
then even though such an entity could likely afford a judgment, such a
judgment against that entity would still result in less revenue for the state,
thereby implicating the state treasury.81 In all of these situations, a state’s
75 See, e.g., P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 878–80 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (conferring
immunity to entity because Puerto Rico would be legally liable for certain kinds of tort suits against an entity
even if not for the particular statutory-based suit at hand).
76 Compare Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 381 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
state law to anticipate that an entity would seek additional funding from the state in the event of a monetary
judgment and holding this fact to support a conferral of immunity to the entity), with Holz, 347 F.3d at 1185
(“[T]he fact that the state may ultimately volunteer to pay the judgment . . . is immaterial; the question is
whether the state treasury is legally obligated.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Durning v. Citibank,
N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1425 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77 E.g., Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting as relevant to the arms inquiry
that an entity received state funds and would pay judgments against it using those state funds). Compare Holz,
347 F.3d at 1182–85 (denying immunity to an entity whose budget was 98% state funds), with Manders v. Lee,
338 F.3d 1304, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (conferring immunity to an entity even though its reliance on
state funding was minimal).
78 Compare Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that
although an entity raised its own funds, these funds were raised under authority of state law and defined as
state funds by state law, and were accordingly state funds), with Beentjes v. Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control
Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that funds raised by an entity by authority of state law
nonetheless did not constitute state funds).
79 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 282–87,
326–29, 331, 370–71, 418–21, 446–48 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing various forms of state and local government
finance mechanisms).
80 See cases cited supra notes 77–78.
81 Compare Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2002) (conferring
immunity to a state lottery commission that contributed rather than received money from the state), with
Burrus v. State Lottery Comm’n, 546 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2008) (declining to confer immunity to state
lottery commission that contributed rather than received money from the state).
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treasury may be practically implicated as a result of a judgment. But even if we
only consider as relevant whether a state is legally responsible (as opposed to
practically responsible) for a judgment imposed against an entity, a wide
conception of legal responsibility may implicate a state treasury to various
degrees.82 Yet, even if we say that a state’s treasury is implicated in some
sense, albeit via ripple effect, the more attenuated the treasury’s being
implicated, the more we might doubt that a particular entity ought to be
cloaked in immunity.
But there is a second and more significant problem with basing an entity’s
arm status solely on a real-party-in-interest assessment, and this problem has
nothing to do with money. There may be instances where the state’s treasury is
assuredly implicated in a suit against a given entity, but the entity’s structural
relationship vis-à-vis the state is so attenuated that the state is unable to
meaningfully hold the entity accountable for the conduct that led to the lawsuit.
If the state lacks direct control and oversight over a given entity, then even
though the state’s financial interests clearly may be implicated in a suit against
that entity, the state may not be able to meaningfully hold the entity politically
accountable so as to prospectively remedy the entity’s offending conduct.83
Thus, an entity’s lack of political accountability vis-à-vis the state should be a
basis for denying immunity to an entity even though the state is found to be the
real party in interest.
B. Reason Two: Protecting the State’s Dignity—Whatever that Means
The discussion up to this point presupposes that the treasury-protection
rationale—championed by Hess—is the normative basis for Eleventh
82 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 51 (1994) (“[I]s the State in fact obligated to
bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise? When the answer is ‘No’—both legally and
practically—then the Eleventh Amendment’s core concern is not implicated.”). In Regents of the University of
California v. Doe, the Court noted that where the state was legally but not practically liable for an entity, then
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity still applied because “it is the entity’s potential legal liability, rather
than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first
instance, that is relevant.” 519 U.S. 425, 431 (1997). Some courts have read Regents to mean that legal
liability but not practical liability matters in the analysis, e.g., Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296,
304 (3d Cir. 2008), and other courts sometimes seem to be willing to reach to find legal liability when only
practical liability is apparent, see, e.g., Holz, 347 F.3d at 1184–85 (discussing a previous case in which the
court considered the high economic value of an entity as a basis for finding the entity performed a “central
government function”). While Regents may have foreclosed practical liability as a viable basis for Eleventh
Amendment immunity, courts have construed legal liability to mean a number of different things beyond a
literal reading that the state must be on the hook to directly pay the specific judgment against a given entity.
83 See discussion infra Part IV.C.

BILSBORROW GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/19/2015 12:33 PM

KEEPING THE ARMS IN TOUCH

835

Amendment sovereign immunity, let alone the arm-of-the-state doctrine, but
many jurists and scholars debate that premise. There may be other normative
values that sovereign immunity protects aside from the state’s financial
integrity. A competing historic and theoretical reading of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity is that such immunity is intended to protect
the states from suits in general, lest their sovereign dignity be affronted.84 The
Court acknowledged this second rationale in Hess,85 and since Hess the Court
has increasingly emphasized the dignity-protection rationale in the Eleventh
Amendment context, culminating in Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority, in which the Court declared that “[t]he
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity
that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”86 While the Court has
yet to make this shift in emphasis explicit in its own arm-of-the-state
jurisprudence,87 some lower courts have nevertheless taken a cue from Federal
Maritime by reducing the weight of factors that measure the degree of state
treasury implication relative to the other factors these courts consider in their
arms analyses.88 The Supreme Court’s willingness to consider nonfinancial
factors in its early arm-of-the-state cases further supports the claim that the
arm-of-the-state doctrine was never understood to protect only a state’s
financial interests.89

84 See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003)
(discussing the ascendency of state dignity as a dominant theme in the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
85 513 U.S. at 47.
86 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002). While some early Supreme Court jurists argued that protecting state dignity
was the theoretical basis for Eleventh Amendment immunity, Chief Justice John Marshall flatly rejected this
argument, and Marshall’s position dominated the Court’s jurisprudence until the early 1990s when the Court
resurrected the dignity rationale. See Scott Dodson, Dignity: The New Frontier of State Sovereignty, 56 OKLA.
L. REV. 777, 799–806 (2003) (critiquing the Court for reviving the dignity rationale on historical and doctrinal
grounds); see also Corey Brettschneider & David McNamee, Sovereign and State: A Democratic Theory of
Sovereign Immunity, 93 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2015) (manuscript at 14–18), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2387666 (critiquing the dignity-protection rationale as a basis for the Court’s
sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
87 Justice O’Connor favored placing greater emphasis on the dignity-protection rationale in Hess—what
she referred to as the states’ sovereignty interest—but her opinion failed to garner majority support. See Hess,
513 U.S. at 59–62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
88 See, e.g., Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 426 F.3d 233, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the
financial-liability factor was relegated from the status as primary to the status as co-equal with other factors
post-Federal Maritime Commission). But see, e.g., Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth., 723 F.3d 640, 651
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting that vulnerability of the state’s coffers is still the most salient issue).
89 Needle, supra note 36, at 221 (“[I]f the ‘who pays the judgment’ question has such power over ‘arm of
the State’ analysis, then it cannot be understood as merely one of several factors . . . . If this question has such
overriding force, there is really no balance at all.”).
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But even if we concede that the dignity-protection rationale is the proper
basis for sovereign immunity generally, or the arm-of-the-state doctrine
specifically, and even if we were to decide that it may be appropriate to extend
the state’s immunity to certain entities even where the state’s treasury is not
implicated at all,90 nonetheless, the dignity-protection rationale is an unhelpful
guide in arm-of-the-state analyses. Whereas the effort to assess state treasury
implication is at least empirically verifiable—we can measure whether the
state will directly or indirectly be forced to pay a judgment—the effort to
assess potential affront to a state’s dignity is not.
If we consider the various factors courts consider in their arms analyses, we
could simply decide that whereas financial factors track the treasury-protection
rationale, nonfinancial factors as a matter of definition track the
dignity-protection rationale.91 Or, we could decide that all of the factors courts
consider, financial and nonfinancial alike, measure whether a state’s dignity
would be affronted by suit against a given entity.92 Indeed, courts have done
both in their arms analyses.93 But such reasoning presupposes that the present
factors courts use actually measure the degree of affront to a state’s dignity.
Such reasoning is conclusory. As a consequence of courts’ moves to map the
dignity-protection rationale onto their preexisting arms tests post hoc, such a
rationale merely serves as a rubber stamp for the analyses that courts already
employ rather than as an operational guide that prescribes which factors will
empirically lead courts to the right result. Ultimately “state dignity is difficult
to translate into an operational legal standard,”94 making it unhelpful as a basis
for the arms framework.

90

E.g., Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 628 F.3d 752, 761–62 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Fourth Circuit has declared three factors to be determinative in evaluating the dignity-protection
rationale, all factors which it likewise considered pre-Hess. Compare Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 184
(4th Cir. 2002) (noting “1) the degree of control that the State exercises over the entity; 2) whether the entity
deals with local rather than statewide concerns; and 3) ‘the manner in which State law treats the entity’”
(quoting Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2001))), with Ram Ditta v. Md.
Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 822 F.2d 456, 457–58 (4th Cir. 1987) (same). Similarly, the First
Circuit has designated the nonfinancial factors it used previously as tracking the dignity-protection rationale in
its refashioned two-prong arms test, which reflects Hess’s twin reasons. See Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R.,
647 F.3d 9, 12–13 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2011).
92 The Third Circuit insists that a concern for the state’s dignity serves as a backdrop for all the factors of
its arms test, financial and nonfinancial factors alike. Cooper v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 302
(3d Cir. 2008).
93 See cases cited supra notes 91–92.
94 Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 402 F.3d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 2005).
91
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Further, as with the treasury-protection rationale, there is a second problem
with basing an entity’s arm status solely on whether a state’s dignity might be
affronted, a problem that has nothing to do with dignity. Even if we decide that
a state’s dignity would be affronted by a suit against a given entity, if there are
not mechanisms presently in place that allow a state to hold the particular
entity accountable for its conduct or policies, then the entity may well continue
to violate the rights of private parties without any repercussion. The
dignity-protection rationale, if state dignity is conceived in the abstract, may
serve as a basis for conferring the state’s immunity upon entities that are not
politically accountable to the state.
C. The Twin Reasons’ Twin Problems: Flawed Theory Produces Flawed
Application
Not only is the Hess twin-reasons framework problematic in theory, but as
lower courts have applied the framework, it has produced results that seem at
odds with Mt. Healthy’s original arm-of-the-state versus political subdivision
dichotomy.95 Presumably, Hess can explain why a political subdivision like a
city or county should not be considered an arm of the state: one would expect
that a city’s finances would be wholly distinct from the state’s finances,96 and
presumably a state’s dignity would not be affronted should a city government
be sued.97 Hence, a conferral of the state’s immunity on such local entities
would be unwarranted.
Yet the Eleventh Circuit has appeared to do what the Supreme Court has
refused to do by extending sovereign immunity protection to county health
departments and county sheriffs.98 In the case of county-level entities, given
the Supreme Court’s clear precedents that a county is not an arm of the state,
intuitively it would seem that neither would a county health department nor a
sheriff be an arm, yet the Eleventh Circuit has held otherwise. To be fair, the
Eleventh Circuit has not held these entities to be immune from suit as a matter
of permanent status but rather conducts its arms analysis on a
95

See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
Though if a city were to receive substantial subsidies from the state, such a fact would appear to
warrant a conferral of immunity under the Hess framework.
97 Though, one could argue that a state’s sovereign dignity would be affronted were a city to be sued
since cities derive their existence from the state and exercise those powers that the state delegates to them. See
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
98 Ross v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 657 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (county
health departments in Alabama); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1328 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (county
sheriffs in Georgia).
96
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function-by-function basis, making an entity’s immunity context specific.99
This reasoning would warrant a conferral of sovereign immunity on political
subdivisions only in certain contexts, but the Supreme Court has appeared to
insist that political subdivisions are precluded from sovereign immunity
categorically.100 At least within some courts, though, county-level entities can
be considered arms of the state. Thus in some cases, it seems the
arm-of-the-state doctrine has morphed into a fingertip-of-the-state doctrine.
At the other extreme, the Seventh Circuit has held that a state lottery
commission was not an arm of the state.101 The State Lottery Commission of
Indiana produces substantial revenue for the state (rather than receiving state
revenue), and presumably the commission was equipped to pay a monetary
judgment itself rather than having to pass a judgment off to the state.102 But
again, intuitively it would seem that a state commission created by state law
exercising a function statewide on behalf of the state would be an arm of the
state. In a case like this, the arm-of-the-state doctrine has become more of a
shoulder-of-the-state doctrine.
Without teasing out these two examples, it should at least be evident that
such results are not intuitive. A county sheriff or health department certainly
seems to occupy the political-subdivision category as Mt. Healthy frames it,
and a state commission would seem to occupy the arm category as a state
agency. What should be clear is that the Hess framework, whether in theory or
in application, is and has been problematic.
To avoid these inherent problems, before courts recognize an entity as an
arm of the state, they should be confident that such an entity is politically
accountable to the state, lest there be no possibility of a check against its
assertion of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, a political-accountability
99 See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308. But see P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 873
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[O]nce an entity is determined to be an arm of the State under the three-factor test, that
conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant changes in the state law governing the entity.”).
100 See cases cited supra note 12.
101 Burrus v. State Lottery Comm’n, 546 F.3d 417, 417–18 (7th Cir. 2008).
102 Id. at 418. In so concluding, the Seventh Circuit appealed to language in Hess demanding that
revenue-generating entities with no financial reliance on the state not be considered immune under the
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 420. Dissenting in Hess, Justice O’Connor was willing to consider additional
considerations beyond just the treasury concern as sufficient bases for a conferral of sovereign immunity, and
given the conservative shift in the Court since Hess was decided, it is not clear that today the Court would
consider an entity’s revenue generation for the state as determinative in warranting a denial of immunity to an
entity like the State Lottery Commission of Indiana. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
60–61 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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rationale needs to be incorporated into the arm-of-the-state doctrine. But is
there any jurisprudential warrant for courts to do so? In short, yes there is.
Part III demonstrates that the doctrinal foundation already exists for such an
analytic move; courts simply need to take the plunge.
III. CONNECTING THE DOTS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: FROM ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE GENERALLY TO THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE
DOCTRINE SPECIFICALLY
This Part first discusses the important role democratic process and political
accountability play in the Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence
generally. Then, this Part examines the doctrinal basis for inferring a political
accountability rationale from the Court’s own arm-of-the-state jurisprudence.
A. Political Process in Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence
As noted at the outset, the doctrine of sovereign immunity serves several
policy objectives, including protection of the state’s treasury and dignity,
ensuring the separation of powers, and promoting government efficiency.103
Also noted at the outset is that sovereign immunity can be understood to
promote democratic processes as well.104 When we talk about the state, we are
not referring to some abstract entity but rather the citizens that comprise the
state.105 These citizens comprise the state electorate, and the electorate
collectively chooses its state lawmakers, who are responsible for passing laws,
approving budgets, and appointing heads to a variety of state agencies. One
function at the core of democratic governance is the allocation of the citizens’
limited tax dollars through various appropriations. The electorate, operating
through the state, may decide to allocate funds so as to permit their courts to
grant relief to private parties harmed by the state.106 If so, the state may decide
to waive its sovereign immunity either in part or in whole so as to honor the
claims of litigants.107 But if the electorate opts to allocate its limited tax
resources for other purposes, the state may instead decide to preserve its
immunity—perhaps resulting in lower taxes.108 This option is likewise
103

See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
J. Brian King, Note, The State Political Processes Theory of the 11th Amendment, 19 REV. LITIG. 355,
356 (2000) (“[S]tate sovereign immunity is the product of a democracy at work.”).
105 See id. at 363.
106 See id. at 360.
107 Most states have waived immunity in some contexts. Id. at 359 & n.15.
108 See id. at 360.
104
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available to the state, in which case private litigation, if permitted by the
courts, would force public payments in an undemocratic manner.109
The obvious objection to sovereign immunity is that it allows for the
violation of individual rights.110 If a state cannot be forced to answer for its
conduct unless it consents to suit, then likewise a state need not respect the
rights of its citizens unless it decides to do so.111 But a preference for sovereign
immunity implies that we necessarily tolerate the occasional violation of
individual rights in exchange for the policy benefits sovereign immunity
provides.112 Thus sovereign immunity amounts to a macro policy preference.113
If, in spite of the policy advantages discussed above, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity still gives us pause, fortunately there is a natural check
built into the system—the check of political accountability. As Professor
Harold Krent has argued, sovereign immunity gives the government the
freedom to pursue policies consistent with democratic majoritarian interests,
but this power is then counterbalanced by the political pressure those same
democratic majorities can exert on lawmakers should the government abuse its
policy discretion.114 Thus, if the government, through its elected officials or
otherwise, engages in behavior or pursues policies that have the effect of
violating individual rights, to the extent that the people disapprove, they can
check the government at the ballot box by electing new officials who will

109 Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and Policy in the
Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 790 (2008) (arguing that private
litigation “allocates public funds in a way that is primarily determined by the judiciary, not the democratic
process, making it more difficult to abide by the principle of majoritarian rule and to maintain the proper
boundaries needed to establish separation of powers”); Brettschneider & McNamee, supra note 86 (manuscript
at 7) (“Retention of the power of the purse requires immunity from suits that could bankrupt or imperil states
from pursuing ends decided upon by the people.”).
110 CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 161–
62 (2008).
111 See Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 1213–15.
112 See Lauren Villa, Note, Public Service, Private Entity: Should the Nature of the Service or Entity Be
Controlling on Issues of Sovereign Immunity?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2004) (“When the cost of
exposure to unlimited liability outweighs the benefits of accountability, the government's ability to continue
public services is placed in jeopardy. Sovereign immunity serves to protect the public by ensuring the
continued availability of essential public services.”).
113 Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 905–06
(2010) (explaining that sovereign immunity reflects a concern for separation of powers and majoritarian rule
rather than a notion that the state is intrinsically infallible).
114 Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1992); see also
Brettschneider & McNamee, supra note 86 (articulating a democratic theory that accounts for and justifies
sovereign immunity).
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cease such behavior or change such policies.115 This remedy may provide no
consolation to individuals whose rights have been violated, and it does little to
cure retrospective wrongs, but as a polity we make these sacrifices for the
resource-allocation freedom we otherwise gain.116 Given this arrangement, the
possibility of political accountability can be the only counterbalancing check
against inequitable applications of sovereign immunity.117
And this check actually works. Exercises of political accountability often
follow in the wake of states’ assertions of sovereign immunity to produce
reforms that prospectively vindicate individual rights. A particularly good
example of this is the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Alden v. Maine, which held that a group of state probation officers seeking
federally mandated overtime wages could not sue the state of Maine in state
court without its consent.118 The officers’ labor union waged a lengthy
lobbying campaign, and their efforts culminated in state legislation granting
partial remuneration to the officers and future wage protections for government
employees, but more significantly, the new law waived Maine’s sovereign
immunity in future wage dispute suits.119
Exercises of political accountability are not guaranteed to follow, of course.
A private party’s ability to vindicate her rights via extrajudicial means is most
likely to succeed if she has access to resources and if the underlying cause is
backed by political support.120 This means that the rights of weaker plaintiffs
with access to fewer resources and whose causes are not politically
sympathetic will likely fail to be vindicated in the face of a state’s assertion of
sovereign immunity.121 Additionally, “situation-specific” conduct by
government agents—such as an instance of a government physician’s
negligence—is also unlikely to be checked by the political process because
such conduct does not stem from and pertain to purposeful policymaking.122
But the point of the political-accountability check to sovereign immunity is not
that every harmed party will be vindicated but rather that the possibility of
115

See Krent, supra note 114, at 1535 (“The only check on these actions is at the ballot box.”).
See id. at 1531 n.5.
117 Sisk, supra note 113, at 900–01 (“When people do suffer significant harm as a result of policy choices
made within constitutional bounds by the government, the remedy lies in democratic governance.”).
118 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); see also SHORTELL, supra note 110, at 132–36.
119 See SHORTELL, supra note 110, at 132–37; see also id. at 80–81, 110–12 (discussing additional
examples where exercises of political accountability followed states’ assertions of sovereign immunity).
120 See id. at 157.
121 See id.
122 Krent, supra note 114, at 1532.
116

BILSBORROW GALLEYSPROOFS2

842

2/19/2015 12:33 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:819

vindication via the political process exists. The electorate may well express a
tacit policy preference for permitting certain rights violations to go unremedied
so as to preserve the state fisc; the doctrine of sovereign immunity simply
allows the majority to select such risk in exchange for reduced public costs if it
so chooses.
The proposition that sovereign immunity and political accountability are
two sides of the same coin is certainly not a new one—the Supreme Court has
been echoing this point for years.123 In the Court’s first case to articulate a
broader conception of state sovereign immunity than that suggested by the
literal words of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana
stressed that it was the legislature’s prerogative to represent the state’s “polity
and its will . . . to preserve justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate the
public obligations.”124 Those who have suffered purported harms are not
without recourse; they simply must seek relief from the politically accountable
legislature rather than from the politically insulated courts. The Court was even
more emphatic about the interplay of sovereign immunity and political process
in Alden v. Maine.125 Holding for the first time that a state could not be
compelled to answer in its own courts for a federally-created claim,126 the
Court explained that “private suits for money damages . . . place unwarranted
strain on the States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will of their
citizens.”127 Since public financial resources are scarce, the decision of how to
spend those limited resources, whether to satisfy judgments or to pay for the
myriad of other public expenses facing the state, should be left to the political
process rather than to the courts to decide.128 Thus, “[w]hen the Federal
Government asserts authority over a State’s most fundamental political
processes, it strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to
our liberty and republican form of government.”129
We see these same concerns expressed in other sovereign immunity
contexts as well. Under the sovereign immunity abrogation doctrine, whereby
Congress may abrogate the states’ immunity in limited contexts via its
123 For a more detailed discussion of the Court’s concern for preserving democratic processes as reflected
in its sovereign immunity jurisprudence and elsewhere, see Marc D. Falkoff, Note, Abrogating State Sovereign
Immunity in Legislative Courts, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 853, 853–69 (2001); King, supra note 104, at 356–64.
124 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890); Falkoff, supra note 123, at 858–59.
125 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
126 Id. at 712.
127 Id. at 750–51.
128 Id. at 751.
129 Id.
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authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
increasingly insisted that Congress do so by means of a sufficiently clear
statement in its legislation.130 The Court’s clear-statement requirement reflects
a concern that Congress should clearly take responsibility and be accountable
when it intends to hold states liable rather than passing off its responsibility
onto the courts.131 The Court’s concern for protecting the states’ distinct
political identities and processes in our federal system is not confined only to
sovereign immunity contexts; we see this concern reflected throughout the
Court’s recent jurisprudence generally.132 And it may be that when we examine
the Court’s dignity language in its recent sovereign immunity cases, we
actually find a concern for protecting the states’ political prerogatives.133
Given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the important role state political
autonomy and political process play in the sovereign immunity context
generally, what is surprising is how absent this emphasis is in its
arm-of-the-state jurisprudence.134 If the state electorate’s ability to hold the
state politically accountable is the only natural check against the immunity the
state otherwise enjoys, then it would seem that a consideration of whether the
electorate is positioned to hold a given entity politically accountable should
play an important role in the courts’ arm-of-the-state analysis as well.135 After
all, the arm-of-the-state doctrine measures the outer reach of sovereign
immunity, determining the minimal requirements that make the state’s interests
sufficiently implicated to warrant a conferral of the state’s immunity on a
particular entity.136 Because this doctrine measures sovereign immunity’s
130

See Falkoff, supra note 123, at 862–63.
See id.
132 See King, supra note 104, at 360–63 (discussing the Court’s emphasis of state autonomy in Commerce
Clause and Tenth Amendment contexts).
133 James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s A Remedy, There’s A Right: A Skeptic’s
Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 319 (2004) (“Dignity is really shorthand for a state’s
prerogative to organize itself and make decisions according to political sensibilities.”). After discussing the
Court’s decisions leading up to and including Alden v. Maine, Leonard concludes: “To sum up, the Court’s
decisions, either explicitly or by application, reflect a view that sovereign immunity protects the political
decision making of the states.” Id. at 320–27; see also Falkoff, supra note 123, at 865–66 (explaining that the
Court’s dignity language reflects a concern for protecting the prerogatives of the politically accountable
branches of government).
134 Of course, such an absence is most obviously due to the fact that the Court has yet to revisit the
arm-of-the-state doctrine in full in the years since Hess.
135 Florey, supra note 109, at 793 (“[T]he democratic-process rationale . . . can prove useful in
determining whether sovereign immunity should be extended to a given situation.”).
136 See Brettschneider & McNamee, supra note 86 (manuscript at 5) (“On our democratic conception of
sovereignty, immunity extends as far as (but no further than) democratic legitimacy warrants. Otherwise, many
legitimate democratic decisions cannot take effect.”).
131
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reach, a consideration of whether sovereign immunity’s natural institutional
check likewise reaches a particular entity is relevant. Only entities with a
sufficiently close relationship with the state, such that the state can
meaningfully hold that entity politically accountable, should be shielded by the
state’s immunity. Some commentators have argued about whether a given
entity should be entitled to enjoy the state’s immunity137 or whether the state
ought to be able to dole out its Eleventh Amendment immunity to whomever it
pleases.138 Such reasoning misses the mark. Sovereign immunity is not
ultimately about immunity entitlements but rather about a delicate
constitutional framework undergirded by principles of federalism designed to
maximally protect conditions that permit democracy.139 Sovereign immunity
cases are about protecting that balance, and this focus should be present in the
arm-of-the-state context as well.
B. The Importance of Political Accountability in Hess
Should courts decide to take seriously a political-accountability rationale in
the arm-of-the-state context, is there any support for such an analytical move in
the Supreme Court’s precedents? Once again, indeed there is. In discussing the
nature of bistate entities in Hess, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, made
a point to stress that because bistate entities are created through the
cooperation of multiple states as well as Congress, “their political
accountability is diffuse; they lack the tight tie to the people of one State that
an instrument of a single State has.”140 She further elaborated: “[W]ithin any
single State in our representative democracy, voters may exercise their political
will to direct state policy; bistate entities created by compact, however, are not
subject to the unilateral control of any one of the States that compose the
federal system.”141 Because a bistate entity’s affairs do not coincide with the
interests of a single statewide electorate, no single statewide electorate could
hold such an entity politically accountable. More forcefully, Ginsburg homed
in on the treasury-protection rationale in her analysis: if the state ultimately

137 See Steven Plitt, Valerie J. Fasolo & Daniel Maldonado, The Changing Landscape of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity in the Context of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act After
Garrett: Are Arizona School Districts Beyond Suit?, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 871, 872–73 (2002).
138 See Kelly Knivila, Note, Public Universities and the Eleventh Amendment, 78 GEO. L.J. 1723, 1729,
1732 (1990).
139 See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
140 Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 42 (1994).
141 Id.
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would be forced to pay a judgment rendered against an entity pertaining to that
entity’s conduct, then the state’s interests are assuredly implicated.142
While courts have readily picked up on Ginsburg’s emphasis of the
treasury-protection rationale,143 it is unclear why courts have failed to give
much weight to her explicit political accountability language. Perhaps courts
considered such analysis to be too specific to bistate entities to be of much use
in more typical arm-of-the-state cases. But one could just as easily extend this
reasoning to intrastate entities, which may be geographically limited to one
county or one part of a state; here too an entity’s affairs would fail to coincide
with the statewide electorate’s interests. In this case, if a single county official
were violating people’s rights, while the statewide electorate potentially could
hold such an official accountable, the statewide electorate is not likely to care
enough to impose the necessary political pressure to check an errant county
official. If an intrastate entity’s jurisdiction or reach did not coincide with the
whole state, then, as with bistate entities, this fact would be grounds for
determining that such an entity is not an arm of the state warranting the
protection of the state’s sovereign immunity.
In her Hess dissent, Justice O’Connor stressed even more emphatically than
Justice Ginsburg the importance of political accountability considerations in
the arms context. O’Connor chided Ginsburg for not giving more weight to the
state control factor.144 If a state exercises sufficient control over an entity, then
the state can hold that entity accountable.145 O’Connor added: “So long as a
State’s citizens may, if sufficiently aggravated, vote out an errant government,
Eleventh Amendment immunity remains a highly beneficial provision of
breathing space and vindication of state sovereignty.”146 For O’Connor, the
danger lies in extending immunity to entities that are not politically
accountable; in such cases an immune entity’s bad conduct or policies could
continue unchecked. Conversely, when a state does wield the kind of control
over an entity allowing for meaningful accountability, this leads to the
conclusion that the given entity is an arm of the state. Thus for O’Connor,
“[a]n arm of the State . . . is an entity that undertakes state functions and is
politically accountable to the State, and by extension, to the electorate.”147
142
143
144
145
146
147

See id. at 48.
See MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.23[4].
See Hess, 513 U.S. at 61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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If we read Ginsburg’s and O’Connor’s opinions together, two elements
appear necessary to ensure an entity is politically accountable to the state.
First, an entity’s affairs must coincide with the state’s interests. Second, a state
must wield sufficient control over an entity to allow the state to hold the entity
politically accountable. Only if both elements are met would a conferral of the
state’s immunity on an entity be warranted.
Neither Ginsburg nor O’Connor explicitly proposed the framework this
Comment has articulated. Ginsburg rendered predominant whether a state’s
treasury would be implicated in a suit against an entity, what this Comment has
subsumed into the “state’s interests” element, and she dismissed the relevance
of the control factor.148 In contrast, O’Connor was willing to confer immunity
on a given entity either for the reason Ginsburg emphasized or because a state
exercises sufficient control over an entity.149 Given O’Connor’s willingness to
consider either basis, her approach to the question of political accountability as
this Comment has framed it appears to be disjunctive,150 whereas the
framework this Comment offers is conjunctive. A conjunctive approach more
effectively gauges whether an entity is politically accountable to the state: if
the electorate, acting through the state, is able but not interested in holding an
entity accountable, then there likely will be no will to do so.151 In contrast, if
the electorate is interested but not able to hold an entity accountable, then any
attempt to hold an entity accountable will be ineffectual. Only if both
conditions are met are the preconditions for political accountability triggered.
At least one circuit has briefly touched on the political accountability
rationale lying dormant in Hess’s precedent.152 This Comment proposes that
more courts follow suit. The incorporation of a political accountability
rationale into the arm-of-the-state doctrine would not require a complete
overhaul of the tests courts currently use or a jettisoning of all the factors they
currently consider. Many of these factors already measure a state’s propensity
to hold entities politically accountable, though courts have not considered such

148

See id. at 47–48 (majority opinion).
Id. at 60–62 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 60–63.
151 By “interested,” I do not mean that the electorate necessarily disapproves of what the entity is doing
but rather that the electorate as a whole stands to be affected by the entity’s conduct or policies and would
therefore be in a position to care.
152 Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “private parties whose only
relationship to the sovereign is by contract” are “certainly more removed from state power, and from
democratic control, than a county or a Compact Clause organization”).
149
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factors through a political-accountability lens.153 And undoubtedly some
factors courts currently consider should fall out of the analysis since it is
unclear what operational rationale informs these factors.154 But incorporation
of a political-accountability rationale into arm-of-the-state jurisprudence would
shore up the weaknesses inherent in the Hess twin-reasons framework,
ultimately giving us confidence that entities dubbed arms of the state properly
warrant that designation. The following discussion imagines how such a
reconceived framework might function.
IV. A PROPOSED POLITICAL-ACCOUNTABILITY-INSPIRED ARM-OF-THE-STATE
FRAMEWORK
This Part lays out a framework for how courts might determine whether a
particular entity is politically accountable to the state, discussing which factors
would and would not matter in that calculus. While the two elements
previously sketched are both necessary to this framework—state interest and
state control—there is less rigidity to how and which factors should be
evaluated under each element. There may be factors or considerations hitherto
not considered by the courts—or this Comment—that prove relevant to the
calculus, and a court could determine that certain factors warrant more or less
weight than others.155 This Comment should ultimately be understood as the
beginning of the conversation rather than the last word.
The following discussion first examines a threshold inquiry concerning
which entity a court should examine when conducting its arms analysis. Then,
discussion turns to an examination of factors especially relevant in deciding
whether a state’s interests are sufficiently implicated by a given entity’s affairs.
Finally, Part IV closes by considering factors measuring whether the state
exercises sufficient control over an entity for political accountability purposes.
A. A Threshold Inquiry: Identifying the Real Entity to Be Examined
Before examining in closer detail the two elements previously sketched, a
threshold question in any arm-of-the-state analysis must be resolved: one must
153

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
155 For example, if an entity received minimal state appropriations, this fact would suggest that the state’s
interests were implicated but not to the same degree as if an entity received significant appropriations from the
state. See, e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 548 (3d Cir. 2007) (willing to
consider that a factor may tilt in one direction or the other rather than weighing factors in a strict binary
fashion).
154
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determine the relevant entity to be examined. The obvious answer would be the
entity being sued. Yet, while not considering this threshold question formally,
courts frequently consider traits of larger parent entities when determining the
arm status of the formally named defendant.156 On the one hand, such analysis
would seem disingenuous—it would seem such courts may examine the traits
of a parent entity simply because the court might be dissatisfied with the
expected result should it only confine its analysis to the traits of the formally
named defendant. But on the other hand, the real-party-in-interest doctrine,
from which the arm-of-the-state doctrine developed, counsels that a court
should determine who the real defendant is rather than just who the nominal
defendant is.157 A clever litigant could target a sub-entity whose parent entity
the litigant knows full well is an arm of the state. Thus courts should identify
the proper entity to be examined.
In making that determination, courts should identify the greatest single
institutional unit whose head officer or board of officers exercises full
discretionary authority all the way down the chain of command. In some cases
a court should consider the central state agency to be the relevant entity even
though a branch office may be the target of the suit. For example, if a state
police department exercised full discretionary control over all its police posts,
it would not make sense for a court to examine an individual post as a distinct
entity.158 The permitted conduct and policies of any individual police post
would likely be indicative of policy statewide, and therefore a court should
consider the statewide entity as a whole. It would be pointless for a court to
recognize an agency as an arm of the state but simultaneously to determine that
the agency’s constituent offices were each vulnerable to suit. While a single
branch office could engage in questionable conduct, if the parent entity truly
exercises centralized control, then such branch conduct would be a function of
the policies of the parent entity that permits such conduct.
In other cases, a court should not examine a larger parent entity as the
relevant entity if a confederated governing structure connects variously
situated entities. For example, if a state created a network of statewide special
purpose districts to effect a particular state policy, such as California’s county
air pollution control districts, and if such districts exercised local
administrative discretion with minimal oversight from a central board, then a
156 E.g., United States ex rel. King v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr.–Hous., 544 F. App’x 490, 495–97
(5th Cir. 2013).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 58–62.
158 See, e.g., Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012).
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single district should be the relevant entity for arm-of-the-state purposes rather
than a central state board.159 In this case, each sub-entity really would be its
own governing unit and the proper point of focus.
Having established the relevant entity to be examined, a court should then
apply factors assessing whether the state’s interests sufficiently coincide with
the entity’s affairs.
B. State Interest Factors
First, courts must determine whether the state’s interests sufficiently
coincide with the entity’s affairs such that the statewide electorate would be
positioned to even care about the entity’s conduct or policies. Put more
concisely, this question asks whether the state is interested in holding the entity
politically accountable. This question does not concern whether the state, its
current leaders, or the statewide electorate do in fact care about the conduct in
question, or whether they approve or disapprove. Rather, this question
concerns whether the entity’s affairs touch upon the statewide electorate’s
concerns as a whole. This is the “state’s interests” element of the framework.
The following factors effectively gauge state interest.
1. Entity’s Effect on State Treasury
This element most naturally captures Hess’s treasury-protection rationale.
If a state stands to pay the judgment entered against a given entity with the
electorate’s tax dollars, then the state’s interests are surely implicated by the
entity’s affairs. But as the discussion in Part II.A explained, there are
gradations in the degree to which a state’s treasury might be implicated. Some
courts are only willing to consider as relevant whether a state will be forced to
pay as a result of the suit at hand, but other courts are willing to consider the
state treasury to be implicated if the entity receives state funds generally or
even contributes money to the state.160
This Comment takes the position that a broader definition of state treasury
implication is appropriate because it more fully reflects the electorate’s
financial interest in the entity’s affairs. But assuming that a broader definition
is appropriate, how much treasury implication is enough? The state’s financial
interests are far less implicated by an entity that receives minimal state funds
159
160

See Beentjes v. Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 782–84 (9th Cir. 2005).
See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text.
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than by an entity that receives millions, and simply calculating the percentage
of an entity’s budget that consists of state funds is not relevant because a small
percentage may represent a large actual dollar amount.161 But making a fixed
dollar amount the relevant threshold is logically flawed because a large sum of
money today may not be considered a large sum of money decades from now
due to inflation. And voters can become incensed to learn that an entity
receiving even nominal tax dollars is behaving in an objectionable manner.162
This Comment does not attempt to resolve the question of how much matters
and instead simply notes that financial interest is only one relevant factor in the
state’s interests element, which itself is just one relevant element in the overall
framework this Comment proposes.
That said, it does matter what a court defines to be state funding. Courts
ought not to define as state funds revenues that a local or regional entity
generates and keeps for itself.163 In the case of assessments, user fees, charges,
revenue bonds, or other kinds of local taxes that an entity may have authority
to impose, such funds are generated locally or paid by those who directly use
the entity’s services.164 These are not general tax dollars paid by the state’s
tax-paying citizens. Thus, if an entity’s funds consist of this local variety of
government funding, local voters might have reason to be upset with how an
entity spends those dollars, but the statewide electorate is not likely to be
concerned.
Also irrelevant in determining whether the state’s treasury is implicated is
whether an entity is capable of generating its own funds,165 or whether the
entity can afford to pay a judgment from its own reserves without having to
rely on the state.166 Such considerations may make sense if one assumes a
narrower definition of state treasury implication that is only concerned with
whether the state will be responsible for the judgment in the instant case. But
161 See, e.g., King, 544 F. App’x at 496 (noting that though only 23% to 26.5% of an entity’s budget
consisted of state funds, these percentages represented millions of dollars).
162 See Lawmakers Deal with Voter Anger over ‘Pork,’ USA TODAY (May 2, 2006, 4:53 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-02-pork-voters_x.htm (discussing voters’ unrest
even when entities receive minimal government appropriations).
163 See, e.g., Beentjes, 397 F.3d at 779 (finding state-authorized vehicle surcharges to be local taxes). But
see Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007) (considering the funds an entity
was authorized to generate under state law to be state funds).
164 See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 79.
165 But see, e.g., Beentjes, 397 F.3d at 780 (finding an entity’s independent revenue-generating ability to
be evidence pointing away from arm-of-the-state status); Rogers, supra note 40, at 1305–08 (arguing that an
entity’s ability to generate its own revenues is relevant in the arms context).
166 E.g., Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006).
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such reasoning is generally highly suspect in other areas of the law—we do not
consider the depth of a defendant’s pockets as relevant to whether a defendant
should be liable in a given case because such reasoning makes a financially
secure defendant an unwilling insurance provider irrespective of whether he
was actually in the wrong.167 Furthermore, the Court has precluded such
reasoning in the arms context, clarifying that the state’s potential legal liability
is what matters, rather than whether the state will actually pay money in the
instant case.168 Thus courts should eschew consideration of an entity’s own
solvency or access to its own funds in determining its arm status.
2. Entity’s Geographic or Jurisdictional Reach
Measuring whether a state’s interests coincide with an entity’s affairs is not
solely a function of finances though; the entity’s jurisdictional or geographical
reach matters too. Courts frequently consider this factor already, though often
as part of a factor that evaluates whether an entity’s functions are state or local
in character.169 If an entity exclusively exercises a particular function in service
to the entire state, then the entire statewide electorate would fall within the
scope of the entity’s conduct or policies.170 In this case, should the entity
violate one person’s rights, there is a chance any member of the statewide
electorate could be the next victim, and therefore the whole electorate is, in a
sense, touched by the entity’s conduct.
In contrast, if the entity were geographically or jurisdictionally confined to
one county or region of the state, the rest of the electorate would be unaffected
by that entity’s conduct or policies.171 Even if a localized entity invoked the ire
of all the voters within that locality, unless the electorate as a whole were
implicated, the state as a whole would be far less likely to hold that localized
entity politically accountable. Local voters may be able to hold a local entity
politically accountable on a local level—for example, county voters might vote
out the county sheriff—but local political accountability is not the same as
state political accountability. Only if the state’s political accountability

167

See FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 431 (1997).
169 See, e.g., Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1996).
170 See Héctor G. Bladuell, Note, Twins or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh Amendment Through a
Three-Prong Arm-of-the-State Test, 105 MICH. L. REV. 837, 858–61 (2007).
171 See, e.g., Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 597 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Bladuell, supra
note 170, at 859.
168
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meaningfully extends to a given entity should there be a basis for conferring
the state’s sovereign immunity to that entity as well.
It is important to note that a designation of arm status may be appropriate
even though an entity’s functions have a narrow focus, which only affect a
segment of the population. Thus, for example, it may be appropriate for a state
division of military affairs to be recognized as an arm of the state, even though
the statewide electorate is not predominantly composed of service members.172
If one were a service member, though, that person would fall within such an
agency’s jurisdiction, and it is in this sense that the entire electorate is
implicated.
C. State Control Factors
As a second element, courts must determine whether the state exercises
sufficient control and oversight over an entity to allow the state to
meaningfully pressure it to change its policies or conduct. Put more concisely,
this question asks whether the state is able to hold an entity politically
accountable. The issue is whether the state presently has the legal means to
control an entity’s conduct, not something akin to cultural or social pressure.
This is the “state control” element of the framework.
The majority in Hess refused to give much weight to the control factor in
its analysis. The majority cited a student commentator, Alex Rogers,173 who
criticized the use of a control factor on the grounds that courts have a tendency
to apply the factor inconsistently and to consider “vague indices of control or
influence,” rendering the use of a control factor unhelpful and unpredictable in
the arms context.174 Ginsburg, writing for the majority, added that states have
the power to dissolve state-created entities like political subdivisions, yet such
ultimate state control does not imply that political subdivisions should be
recognized as arms of the state.175
In her Hess dissent, O’Connor directly challenged the majority’s
assessment. She insisted that “[t]he critical inquiry . . . [is] whether and to what
extent the elected state government exercises oversight over the entity.”176
172

See, e.g., Jones v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 46–47 (2d Cir. 1999).
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1994) (citing Rogers, supra note 40,
at 1280, 1302 & n.264).
174 Rogers, supra note 40, at 1280–84.
175 See Hess, 513 U.S. at 47.
176 Id. at 61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
173
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According to O’Connor, two considerations are especially relevant in
determining whether the state’s “lines of oversight are clear and substantial”;
these include whether “the State appoints and removes an entity’s governing
personnel and retains veto or approval power over an entity’s undertakings.”177
O’Connor acknowledged Ginsburg’s point that states exercise ultimate control
over state-generated entities in their ability to dissolve such entities at will, but
she argued that “does not mean that state governments actually exercise
sufficient oversight to trigger Eleventh Amendment immunity under a
control-centered formulation.”178 Instead, “[t]he inquiry should turn on real,
immediate control and oversight, rather than on the potentiality of a State
taking action to seize the reins.”179 While O’Connor’s view was the dissenting
view, lower courts have generally followed O’Connor in taking state control
factors seriously.180 Accordingly, this Comment’s framework affirms
consideration of state control as O’Connor articulated by arguing that the
relevant control factors in the arms context are, first, the state’s ability to freely
remove an entity’s governing officers, and second, the state’s ability to wield
general veto power over the entity’s conduct and policies.181
1. State Removal Power
The first relevant control factor is whether the state, through the governor,
legislature, or otherwise, has the legal authority to freely remove an entity’s
officers or board members at will outside the state’s normal impeachment
process.182 Should the state merely have the power to appoint board members
but not to remove and replace them, such an indicator of control would give
courts no meaningful information as to whether the state could hold the entity
politically accountable should the entity’s leadership engage in behavior or
pursue policies the electorate finds to be unacceptable.183 Officers that cannot
be removed have little incentive to conform their conduct to the expectations
of those who appointed them. Removal power, not just appointment power, is
177

Id.
Id. at 62.
179 Id.
180 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 123.23[4][b][i] (showing most circuits assess forms of state control
as a relevant factor in their arms analyses).
181 Some courts ask whether an entity is autonomous from the state, which is basically the same thing as
asking whether the state exercises control over the entity. E.g., Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296,
299 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (measuring the entity’s autonomy from the state).
182 See Hess, 513 U.S. at 47 (considering removal power).
183 E.g., Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding state’s
appointment power of little relevance without state’s removal power).
178
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what matters.184 And the state’s ability to impeach and thereby remove an
entity’s officers is not a relevant form of removal power because such a drastic
measure is usually reserved for truly blameworthy conduct, rather than used as
a means of removing officers who make administrative and policy choices that
state officials find objectionable.185 The power to impeach is a kind of ultimate
state control akin to the kind of state power to dissolve entities, which both
Ginsburg and O’Connor denounced as having any relevance to the inquiry.186
2. State General Veto Power
The second relevant control factor is whether the state exercises general
veto power over an entity’s conduct and policy decisions. The state could
certainly exercise meaningful control over an entity without micromanaging
the entity’s affairs; the question is whether the state could ultimately step in
and trump an entity’s discretion in carrying out its affairs if the state decided to
do so.187 But veto power is a matter of degree, and courts make a mistake to
cherry pick mere isolated instances of state oversight or regulation as relevant,
particularly where such oversight or regulation has no connection to the
conduct that led to the suit.188 For example, if a state merely received reports or
records from an entity without the ability to act on that information, that would
not amount to meaningful control;189 but, if the state received meaningful
information and feedback from an entity coupled with the ability to control an
entity’s policies and conduct, then that would amount to meaningful control.190
But not all of the factors courts currently consider are helpful in
determining whether an entity should be recognized as an arm of the state, as
Part V illustrates.
184 Rogers, supra note 40, at 1265 (“The power to appoint does not translate into the power to
control . . . .”).
185 See Carrie Yutzy, How Does the Impeachment Process Work?, LEGALZOOM (Dec. 2009),
http://www.legalzoom.com/legal-headlines/government-politics/how-does-impeachment-process.
186 See supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding autonomy
factor to point toward immunity where the Governor ultimately exercised veto power over the entity’s
decisions though the entity generally managed its own affairs).
188 See, e.g., Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 2007) (considering
as relevant that entity had to comply with certain employment, finance, and reporting regulations).
189 See, e.g., Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding the state
lacked sufficient veto power over an entity that was required to submit to the state an annual report but where
state removal and general veto power were lacking).
190 See, e.g., Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1254–55 (finding the entity’s auditing and reporting requirements
combined with forms of state oversight and removal power indicative of state control).
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V. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENTLY USED ARM-OF-THE-STATE FACTORS
Having laid out the questions and factors that best measure whether an
entity is politically accountable to the state, this section briefly considers a
variety of factors courts presently consider that distort the
political-accountability calculus. This Comment groups these factors into three
categories: (A) factors attempting to gauge state intent, (B) factors that are
inherently definitional, and (C) factors that otherwise fail to gauge political
accountability.
A. Factors Attempting to Gauge State Intent
One misleading factor some courts consider is whether the state intends for
an entity to be cloaked in the state’s sovereign immunity.191 Courts may also
consider differently worded factors that essentially are proxies of state intent
such as “how state law treats the agency generally,”192 the “general legal
status” of the entity,193 or whether the state has “structured the entity to share
its sovereignty.”194 Framed this way, the entire arm-of-the-state inquiry can be
cast in terms of state intent. Has the state intended that a given entity should be
an arm cloaked in immunity as indicated by all the factors courts consider?
This broad, general sense of state intent derives from language in the Supreme
Court’s cases suggesting that the entire arms inquiry is one of discerning state
intent.195 But to treat intent as a factor in this sense is to collapse the entire
inquiry into a single factor; doing so is no substitute for the substantive
analysis otherwise necessary in gauging political accountability.

191 E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). The First Circuit initially attempts
to determine whether the state’s explicit intent is clear, and if the answer is ambiguous, it proceeds to consider
additional factors as evidence of intent. Id.
192 Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
193 Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d
843, 845–47 (7th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Fresenius Med.
Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr., 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003))
(internal quotation mark omitted) (subsuming into this question all the factors of its arms test). The District of
Columbia Circuit separately lists state intent as one of its arms factors, but to frame the entire question as
“whether the State ‘clearly structured the entity to share its sovereignty’” implies that an overall assessment of
the state’s intent is in view. Id. (quoting Fresenius, 333 F.3d at 68).
195 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) (“Unless
there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special
constitutional protection of the States themselves . . . there would appear to be no justification for reading
additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment.”).
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State intent, if conceived in this broad sense, is a fairly useless factor unless
courts mean that specific intent is what matters: did the state intend not merely
to create the kind of entity so structured that a federal court would recognize
the entity as an arm of the state, but rather did the state specifically intend,
regardless of the entity’s structure and relationship to the state, that a federal
court would honor a state’s choice that an entity be immune from suit?196
While the Supreme Court’s arms cases have suggested that intent matters, the
language of its opinions suggests they have in mind the former understanding
of intent rather than the latter.197 Furthermore, the Court’s insistence that
arm-of-the-state doctrine is a matter of federal law, and that state law is
consulted merely to discern the nature of the entity’s character, would appear
to preclude state-specific intent per se as a relevant consideration.198 It makes
little sense to read the Court as saying that various factors are relevant in
discerning whether the state intended to structure an entity a certain way, one
of which is the factor of the state’s own specific intent. Either specific intent
should be dispositive, which the Court’s use of factor-based tests precludes, or
else intent is a collective function of all the factors.
But suppose the Court did mean to imply that specific intent matters, which
some lower courts have intimated199—should it?200 On the one hand, assuming
such intent is even objectively discernable in the relevant state law, a factor
gauging state-specific intent as to an entity’s immunity status would appear to
fit comfortably within the political-accountability rationale this Comment has
articulated. Particularly if lawmakers included a clear statement in the relevant
statute that a given entity is to be cloaked in the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity,201 then such intent arguably reflects a policy choice on the part of
the electorate acting through their lawmakers, which the electorate could later
demand be changed if it so chooses, and this policy preference should then be
honored by federal courts.202
On the other hand, a state ought not to be able to bestow its Eleventh
Amendment immunity upon entities whose affairs do not coincide with the
196 See, e.g., Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 596 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]his court
examines . . . whether the state statutes and caselaw view the agency as an arm of the state . . . .”).
197 See Lake Country Estates, Inc., 440 U.S. at 401.
198 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997).
199 E.g., Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 265 (4th Cir. 2005).
200 For commentary arguing that state specific intent should matter, see Bladuell, supra note 170, at 853–
57; Rogers, supra note 40, at 1301–05.
201 E.g., Md. Stadium Auth., 407 F.3d at 265.
202 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 1290–91.
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state electorate as a whole or that the state has created in such a way that it
cannot control them; this would violate the sovereign immunity versus political
accountability balance. The following example illustrates this point: suppose a
state created a confederated network of special districts covering the state to
serve a specific policy function, such as pollution control.203 Suppose the state
created these entities to largely be independently managed with locally elected
officers and each financed by their own state-authorized local taxes or revenue
bonds. Suppose further that the state lacked both general veto power over the
special districts and the ability to remove their officers at will. In short,
suppose the state decided these entities should be isolated from the state’s own
political pressures. But finally, suppose that the state included in the statute
authorizing such entities a clear statement that each was to partake of the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. What result?
One could argue that such isolated special districts should be considered
arms of the state because the state, representing the statewide electorate, chose
to confer Eleventh Amendment immunity upon such entities (or attempted to
do so). But such entities would be so isolated from the state that, unless they
generally manifested consistent policies statewide, it is unlikely the entire
statewide electorate could ever be mobilized to pressure the state to repeal the
clear statement of specific intent in the future. In such a case, the voice of the
electorate at one point in time would effectively bind the wishes of all future
electorates.204 Thus, for political accountability to be meaningful, it must be
constantly present. Accordingly, courts should not consider any indications of
the state’s specific intent in their arms analyses.
Even assuming that state intent were a legitimate factor to be considered in
the arms context, short of a clear statement of specific intent, it is doubtful that
courts can reliably discern whether a state intends for an entity to be shielded
by its immunity.205 Often, sources of state law, including constitutions,
statutes, and case law,206 can be ambiguous or contradictory.207 And courts
203

See Beentjes v. Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 776 (9th Cir. 2005).
See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“[O]ne legislature cannot abridge the powers
of a succeeding legislature.”). In this case, while a subsequent legislature could remove a statement of specific
intent from an entity’s enabling statute, a prior legislature would have systematically removed the source of
political pressure that would normally inform the legislature in the exercise of its powers.
205 Rogers, supra note 40, at 1288–91.
206 See, e.g., Md. Stadium Auth., 407 F.3d at 257–58 & nn.2–4, 265 (considering state statutes,
regulations, constitutional provisions, and state case law to determine how state law treats an entity).
207 See Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 640 F.3d 821, 830–33 (8th Cir. 2011) (engaging
in a detailed parsing of state law in an attempt to discern whether the state’s treasury was legally implicated).
204
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may be willing to give weight to any number of texts in determining intent, all
the way down to amicus briefs filed by the state’s attorney general.208
Furthermore, courts may inappropriately read significance into texts and
phrases that may never have been intended to bear on the arm-of-the-state
question.209 Limited space here precludes a full examination of how courts’
attempts to “divine the state’s intent” can be highly problematic.210 Suffice it to
say, the factor of state intent, whether explicit or implicit, is of little utility in a
political-accountability-inspired arm-of-the-state framework.
B. Factors that are Inherently Definitional
Courts should also avoid considering factors that are inherently
definitional.211 These factors themselves require line drawing in an arms
context already requiring a fair amount of line drawing. Many courts attempt to
discern whether an entity’s functions are more properly considered state
functions or local functions.212 Similarly, courts consider whether an entity’s
functions are more governmental or proprietary in nature.213 With the growth
and fragmentation of state government and the increasing pressure for
government to provide additional services, states have spawned numerous
hybrid government entities that are difficult to classify.214 Nevertheless, courts
have persisted in using these definitional factors in their analyses.
The problem with such line drawing is that it is driven more by intuition
than any clear normative standards. An entity may engage in state functions
and local functions or functions that are both.215 The same may be said about
governmental versus proprietary functions. Where one draws the line depends
on what one chooses to focus on. One might just as well decide that a public

208

Cf. P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 531 F.3d 868, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On the one hand,
considering a brief filed by a state official to determine how state law conceives of an entity appears to fit the
political accountability rationale: if the electorate is unhappy with how its politically accountable officials have
characterized entities in litigation, it can vote such officials out of office. On the other hand, efforts to glean
state-intent evidence from amicus briefs serves as an example of how far courts may be willing to reach to
support one outcome or another.
209 See Plitt et al., supra note 137, at 910–12; Rogers, supra note 40, at 1284 n.193.
210 E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 25.
211 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 40, at 1296.
212 E.g., Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
213 E.g., Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, 12 n.2 (1st Cir. 2011).
214 Beckham, supra note 13, at 147.
215 See Gorton, 554 F.3d at 63 (finding the state versus local factor to be neutral since public education is
both a state and local function in New York); Rogers, supra note 40, at 1278–79.

BILSBORROW GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/19/2015 12:33 PM

KEEPING THE ARMS IN TOUCH

859

school district serves a local function,216 a state function,217 or something in
between.218 A state police department may consist of individual branch offices
all over the state, and yet the significance of any single branch office may be
incidental to what is actually a centralized oversight and management
arrangement.219 It is not clear that an individual state police post can be
understood to neatly serve either a state or local function. And an entity’s
otherwise local functions may nevertheless have significant statewide
impact.220
Similarly, with the privatization trend of recent decades, states have
outsourced the provision of services to government contractors or have opted
to create a number of quasi-public entities to provide services, with courts
wrestling with how to categorize such entities.221 In other areas of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court has long since abandoned the effort to
define government functions as either governmental or proprietary in nature.222
Accordingly, it likewise makes little sense for courts to continue the state
versus local and governmental versus proprietary line drawing exercises in the
arms context.
Aside from the objective sorting difficulty these dichotomies create, even
assuming such sorting can be done objectively, these factors tell us nothing
about the degree of political accountability the state wields over the entity in
question. Privatization aside, state governments have increasingly taken on
additional services beyond traditional core governmental functions, whatever
we might imagine those to be.223 But that does not mean that the state’s
interests are any less implicated or the state any less able to hold an entity
216 See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding public
schools in Arizona not to serve a central government function).
217 E.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 253 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding public schools
in California to serve a central government function).
218 E.g., Gorton, 554 F.3d at 63 (finding public schools to serve both state and local functions in New
York).
219 See, e.g., Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012).
220 Rogers, supra note 40, at 1277.
221 Compare Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a government
contractor not to be an arm), with Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308,
1311–12 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding a government contractor to be an arm).
222 E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (“We therefore now
reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity . . . that turns on a judicial
appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”); see also Rogers, supra
note 40, at 1276 (discussing various areas of constitutional law where the governmental versus proprietary
distinction has been abandoned).
223 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 1243–44.
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politically accountable if the function has traditionally been considered
proprietary in nature. And while the state versus local distinction would seem
to be relevant to the political-accountability rationale, that is because it is a
proxy for the geographic or jurisdictional factor discussed previously.224 The
better approach is for courts to consider an entity’s jurisdictional scope directly
rather than approximating that factor with the non-falsifiable state versus local
definitional factor.
C. Factors that Otherwise Fail to Gauge Political Accountability
Finally, courts should avoid considering factors that otherwise reveal
nothing about political accountability.225 For example, courts sometimes
consider whether an entity can hold property or enter contracts in its own
name,226 whether the entity can carry its own liability insurance,227 what the
entity’s tax status is,228 whether the entity can sue or be sued,229 or what the
entity’s corporate status is in the enabling legislation.230 Such factors may be
proxies for measuring the entity’s autonomy or legal status,231 but as a measure
of an entity’s political accountability in their own right, these factors are of
little use.
Courts further consider whether an entity has the ability to generate
state-authorized revenue itself,232 exercise the power of eminent domain,233 or
whether the entity is heavily regulated by the state.234 But cities are likewise
authorized by the state to tax and exercise the power of eminent domain and

224

See supra Part IV.B.2.
Courts often consider these factors as indicia under other factors, e.g., Cooper v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
548 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering under the “status under state law” factor whether the entity was
separately incorporated, whether it could sue or be sued, and whether it was immune from state taxation), but
sometimes these factors are considered independently, e.g., Del Campo, 517 F.3d at 1077 (considering
whether an entity can sue or be sued, whether an entity can take property in its own name, and an entity’s
corporate status as independent factors).
226 E.g., Cooper, 548 F.3d at 309.
227 E.g., id.
228 E.g., Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2012).
229 E.g., Del Campo, 517 F.3d at 1077.
230 E.g., Beentjes v. Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 778, 784–85 (9th Cir. 2005)
(considering as relevant an entity’s classification as a “body corporate” in the entity’s enabling statute (quoting
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40700 (1996))).
231 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 1284–87 (categorizing these as “jural independence” factors).
232 E.g., Tucker, 682 F.3d at 659.
233 E.g., Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 1996).
234 E.g., Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 640 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir. 2011).
225
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cities are bound by state regulations,235 yet cities are not arms of the state.236
Courts should not consider factors that are just as applicable to political
subdivisions as to arms of the state, not only because such factors falsely
differentiate but also because, again, such factors are not instructive of whether
the entity is actually politically accountable.
Having discussed factors that are both helpful and unhelpful in the
political-accountability-inspired arm-of-the-state framework this Comment
recommends, Part VI explores how this framework might work in practice.
VI. TESTING A POLITICAL-ACCOUNTABILITY-INSPIRED ARM-OF-THE-STATE
FRAMEWORK
In this final Part, this Comment illustrates how the political-accountability
framework described here might be applied by examining United States ex rel.
King v. University of Texas Health Science Center–Houston, recently decided
by the Fifth Circuit.237 After applying its arm-of-the-state test, the court held
that University of Texas Health Science Center–Houston (UTHSCH) was an
arm of the state of Texas and therefore immune from suit.238 The plaintiff
petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that UTHSCH should not be
considered an arm of the state and additionally requested the Court to clarify
its arm-of-the-state framework.239 The Court denied certiorari and accordingly
declined the opportunity to clarify the doctrine.240 Thus, this Comment will
attempt to give the plaintiff her day in court. This Part first summarizes the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis; it then briefly critiques that analysis; and finally, it
examines the facts of King in light of the framework proposed by this
Comment, concluding that King’s outcome would be a much closer result.
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis of King
In holding that UTHSCH is an arm of Texas for Eleventh Amendment
purposes, the Fifth Circuit examined UTHSCH using its six-factor test:

235 See 4 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 23:3 (West 2014) (discussing tax power); 3 id.
§ 21:11 (discussing eminent domain); 3 id. § 14:4 (discussing relationship between state and local law).
236 Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
237 544 F. App’x 490 (5th Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 1767 (2014).
238 Id. at 499.
239 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 5, 23–24, 29.
240 134 S. Ct. 1767 (mem.).
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(1) whether the state statutes and caselaw characterize the agency as
an arm of the state; (2) the source of funds for the entity; (3) the
degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is
concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide problems;
(5) whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own
name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use
property.241

In applying the first factor, the court noted that while none of the sources of
Texas state law explicitly characterized UTHSCH as an arm of the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes, less explicit indicia of the state’s
characterization of UTHSCH were enough to point toward immunity.242 The
court noted that Texas’s constitution provides for a University of Texas System
(UTS) of which UTHSCH was a part, and state law defined “a [public]
university system or an institution of higher education” to be a “state
agency.”243 The court was also persuaded by the existence of state decisional
law referring to UTHSCH as an agency or governmental entity.244
Applying the second factor, the court was persuaded that UTHSCH’s
funding scheme pointed toward arm status.245 While the court acknowledged
only 23% to 26.5% of UTHSCH’s funding consisted of state funds, the court
stressed the large values such percentages represented: “$26 million from
student tuition and fees . . . about $170 million in direct state appropriations,
and . . . over $25 million from other state agencies.”246 While the plaintiff
argued UTHSCH would legally be unable to use its segregated state funds to
pay a judgment anyway, implying that the state’s financial interests were not
implicated, the court rebuffed this argument.247 The court cited favorably Fifth
Circuit precedent holding that because legislatures appropriate funds to entities
based on their expected budgetary needs, unexpected judgments against such
entities would cut against the financial assumptions upon which the legislature
made its appropriations, thereby interfering with the state’s fiscal autonomy.248
Because UTHSCH received substantial funding and a judgment against it

241

King, 544 F. App’x at 495.
Id. at 495–96.
243 Id. at 495 (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 572.002(10)(B) (West 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
244 Id. at 495–96.
245 Id. at 496–97.
246 Id. at 496.
247 See id.
248 Id. at 497 (citing Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976)).
242
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would interfere with the state’s fiscal autonomy, this factor pointed toward
immunity.249
Applying the third factor, the court found that UTHSCH did not exercise
local autonomy because UTHSCH is part of UTS, which itself is governed and
administered by a single board of regents whose members are appointed by the
Texas governor with the consent of the senate.250 Additionally, the court found
that all UTHSCH contracts were subject to the board of regents’ rules or
approval and that UTHSCH had to comply with various accounting and
financial reporting requirements as a state agency, further evidence pointing
toward immunity.251
Applying the sixth factor out of order, the court found that the board of
regents fully controlled all lands held by UTS, of which UTHSCH was a
part.252 Also, the court noted that state law gave the board power to acquire
land via eminent domain, adding that such acquired property was by definition
state land.253 These facts likewise pointed toward immunity.254
Applying the fourth factor, the court reasoned as it had under previous
factors that UTHSCH was properly understood as part of a statewide university
system, UTS, and such a system, with its statewide branches, was not occupied
primarily with local concerns.255 The court was comfortable finding that
education and research were matters of statewide concern in Texas as a matter
of definition per state law, again pointing toward immunity.256
Only the fifth factor pointed away from immunity: the court found that
UTHSCH could sue and be sued as a separate, distinct entity under Texas
law.257
Nonetheless, the court concluded that because five of six factors in its
arm-of-the-state test pointed toward immunity, UTHSCH should be recognized
as an arm of the state of Texas.258
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 497–98.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
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B. Critique of the Fifth Circuit’s Arm-of-the-State Analysis
The Fifth Circuit’s arm-of-the-state analysis unfortunately suffers from
many of the problems identified by this Comment. First, the court engages in
definitional reasoning, apparently attempting to discern state intent with
respect to UTHSCH. This Comment has argued that the state’s intent factor is
normatively unjustified in the arms context because states could intend that an
entity enjoy the state’s immunity without responsibly structuring the entity to
be responsive to the state’s political pressures, which undermines the rationale
this Comment argues should animate the arm-of-the-state doctrine.259
Accordingly, the court’s effort to discern whether UTHSCH is defined as a
state agency under state law, whether its lands are defined as state lands, and
whether education and research are considered state functions is unhelpful to
the analysis given the inherently definitional nature of such considerations.260
Additionally, factors such as whether an entity can sue and be sued or hold
property in its own name, standing alone, are similarly unhelpful to the
analysis for reasons discussed previously.261 And finally, when assessing the
state’s degree of control that it exercises over UTHSCH, the court majored on
the minors and minored on the majors. The court considered such extraneous
facts as whether UTHSCH was required to comply with certain kinds of state
regulations and whether its contracts were subject to approval by the board of
regents, but the court failed to consider substantive indicia of control such as
whether the state could remove the members of the board of regents or veto its
decisions.262 Thus, much of the court’s analysis is normatively problematic in
light of the considerations discussed in this Comment.
C. King in Light of this Comment’s Proposed Framework: A Different Result?
An examination of this case in light of this Comment’s political
accountability framework may well yield a different result. First, as a threshold
inquiry, the entity properly under examination in this case should be UTS, the
University of Texas System, rather than UTHSCH. The Fifth Circuit focused
on UTHSCH as a distinct entity, but it examined four of its six factors with
respect to UTS, of which UTHSCH is a part.263 This kind of back and forth
259
260
261
262
263

See supra Part V.A.
King, 544 F. App’x at 495–96.
See supra Part V.C.
See King, 544 F. App’x at 497.
Id. at 495–98.
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shifting conflates the issues and suggests the court is searching for the facts
that might support its holding rather than examining a single defined entity and
letting whatever conclusion flow that may from a consistent examination of
that entity. The plaintiff criticized the court’s conflation of UTHSCH with
UTS as tautological.264 But following this Comment’s prescription that a court
should examine as the relevant entity the largest institutional unit exercising
administrative and policy control over the entire unit, UTS would appear to be
the right point of reference. The board of regents exercises full control over
UTS, of which UTHSCH is a part.265 Presumably this means that the board of
regents of UTS has discretion to remove officers or employees all the way
down the chain of command and has power to override decisions made by such
individuals. Anyone working for UTHSCH is thus accountable to the board of
regents. Thus UTS, which is controlled by the board of regents, is the
appropriate entity to be examined.
Under this Comment’s first element, a court should find that Texas’s
interests sufficiently coincide with UTS’s affairs, thus pointing toward
immunity. First, Texas law makes plain that UTS’s jurisdiction or geographic
reach covers the whole state.266 Second, UTS as a whole presumably receives
substantial state funds. While the Fifth Circuit only considered UTHSCH’s
finances, one can fairly infer that UTHSCH’s funding is likely representative
of all sister schools in the UTS network, meaning that UTS is a recipient of
such state funds. Because the electorate as a whole is likely to care about the
conduct and policies of an entity that covers the whole state and consumes
substantial state tax dollars, the state’s interests element points toward arm
status.
Under this Comment’s second element, however, a court may find that
Texas does not wield the kind of immediate control over UTS warranting a
conferral of immunity, though this is a closer call. First, it is unclear whether
the members of UTS’s board of regents can be removed at will by the state.
While state statutory law governing UTS provides that members of the board
of regents are to be appointed by the governor and approved by the senate, the
statute is silent as to whether board members can likewise be removed at
will.267 The language of the Texas constitution indicates that the governor and

264
265
266
267

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 12.
King, 544 F. App’x at 497.
See id. at 495–98.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 65.11 (West 2012).
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senate acting together can remove board members.268 But this removal
mechanism is addressed by the part of Texas’s constitution concerning
impeachment, and a full-blown impeachment process or a related removal
mechanism that is permitted for cause is not the kind of immediate,
discretionary removal power that this Comment’s framework anticipates.269
Admittedly, this past year the Texas House of Representatives came close to
impeaching a member of the board of regents on policy grounds rather than the
kind of criminal or unethical behavior impeachment traditionally concerns,270
and a court might be persuaded by this example that the state’s available
mechanism for ousting board of regents members does create enough political
accountability to point toward immunity, but this is a closer call. Second, there
is no evidence the governor or the legislature wields the kind of discretionary
administrative veto power over the board this Comment also considers
relevant. Thus, on the whole, there is a strong argument that the state control
element points away from immunity.
Because one of the two elements considered here arguably fails to be
satisfied, UTS and its sub-entities should not be recognized as arms of the
state. But what to take away from this case study?
First, suppose a court applied this Comment’s framework to King’s facts
(and in particular was satisfied that Texas does wield sufficient control over
UTS) and therefore reached the same result as the Fifth Circuit in granting
immunity. Would that defeat this Comment’s central premise that the
arm-of-the-state doctrine needs a better framework? In short, no. The
foregoing discussion illustrates that a political-accountability-inspired
arm-of-the-state framework makes the outcome in King a closer call;
accordingly, there are many borderline cases where a more coherent
framework would make a critical difference in outcomes. And one should hope
268 TEX. CONST. art. XV, § 9(a) (“In addition to the other procedures provided by law for removal of
public officers, the governor who appoints an officer may remove the officer with the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the members of the senate present.”); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 65.11 (“The government
of the university system is vested in a board of nine regents appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the senate.”).
269 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 665.002, 665.052, 665.054 (West 2012).
270 See Marissa Barnett, Panel Censures but Doesn’t Impeach UT Regent Wallace Hall,
DALLASNEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:47 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/headlines/20140811panel-censures-but-doesnt-impeach-hall.ece. The Texas House of Representatives stopped just short, censuring
the board member instead, and the house’s threatened impeachment was unusual because unelected state
officials had only been impeached twice during Texas history, both for criminal acts. Skip Hollandsworth,
Is This the Most Dangerous Man in Texas?, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 2014), http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/
ut-regent-wallace-hall-controversy-investigation-and-impeachment.
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that this Comment’s framework would confirm the result in a number of past
cases. At the least, it is more analytically sound for courts to reach the right
result in a given case because of the framework used rather than in spite of the
framework used.
But as this Comment has argued, this Comment’s proposed framework may
well call for a different result in King, which hopefully illustrates important
ways the arm-of-the-state doctrine needs to be improved. An opposite result in
King would surely cut against considerable precedent across the circuits, which
generally tends to confer arm status to state universities,271 and some may find
it alarming that many state universities could potentially be stripped of their
arm status under the framework this Comment proposes. But if the goal is to
identify an analytically sound and normatively justified arm-of-the-state
framework, one should not assess any proposed framework in light of whether
it validates previous holdings, for that begs the normative question. Instead,
this Comment argues that we must determine whether the entity under
consideration is actually politically accountable. If it should be the case that
many state universities are not, then they should not be recognized as arms. For
those who believe that state universities’ immunity should be preserved, the
solution is simple: states can modify their laws so that officials like the
members of the board of regents in this case can easily be removed by the
state. But courts should not confer immunity on entities that are not politically
accountable to the state.
CONCLUSION
As things stand, one cannot reliably predict what a government entity’s arm
status may be without actually litigating the case. The arm-of-the-state
doctrine’s lack of predictive value does a disservice to potential plaintiffs,
government entities, and states alike in managing their expectations. Unless the
Supreme Court adopts a simple, bright-line rule, arms jurisprudence will
continue to be a heavily fact-dependent affair requiring considerable judicial
effort and discretion. Critics are right to bemoan the condition of this
complicated, nonintuitive doctrine.
But what critics should also bemoan is that, while courts take the natural
institutional check of political accountability as a given in Eleventh
271 Frank H. Julian, The Promise and Perils of Eleventh Amendment Immunity in Suits Against Public
Colleges and Universities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 85, 99–102 (1995) (detailing examples of public universities
being designated as arms of the state).
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Amendment jurisprudence generally, to date, this concern has barely surfaced
in the arm-of-the-state context. It may be that judicial intuition and
fact-specific precedents usually lead courts to the right result. But until a
concern for political accountability is made explicit as an operational rationale
guiding the courts’ factor-based arms analyses, we must continue to rely on
jurisprudential luck to ensure that arm-of-the-state cases result in normatively
justified outcomes Where entities are sheltered from both the threat of suit as
well as the political pressures that counterbalance sovereign immunity, their
incentives are skewed, and the delicate system of checks and balances and
separation of powers that preserves the soil of democracy is undermined.
Courts must take political accountability seriously if states are to keep their
arms in touch.
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